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This article explores how young people  (aged 12-18)  in  the three Baltic 
states  of  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  are  constructing  their  identities, 
particularly their sense of attachment to their country and to Europe. This 
generation is of particular significance, in that they are the first generation 
for many years to have been born and socialised in independent states that 
are in a relatively peaceful and stable state. Data was collected through 22 
focus groups, conducted in 10 different locations in the different states, 
and were analysed in terms of the degree of enthusiasm expressed for civic 
institutions and cultural practices related to the country and to Europe. Two 
particular areas were identified: the sense of generational difference and 
the ways in which different groups created ‘other’ communities, within and 
without their country’s borders. These parameters allow us to distinguish 
the significant communities that these young people are creating in order 
to make sense of their social and political worlds.
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1 Background
Citizenship  and  civic  identity  have  been  traditionally  associated  with  a 
defined, limited and exclusive area or territory (Mackenzie 1978). Over the 
past sixty years, this conception has become gradually and partially eroded, 
through  processes  such  as  globalisation,  large  scale  migration,  and  the 
development of dual citizenship (Joppke, 2010: vi-viii). The development of 
the  European  Union  (EU)  has  contributed  another  layer  of  complexity. 
Citizens  of  the  countries  that  are  members  of  the  Union  are  now  also 
citizens of the EU, and this second citizenship gives them rights that are 
superior to those rights given by their country’s citizenship (Joppke 2010). 
As  the  EU  has  expanded,  this  citizenship–and  these  rights–have  been 
extended to include an increasing number of Europeans. The border of the 
EU has moved between its inception in 1956 and its most recent expansion 
in 2007 with further border movements planned in coming years.1
1 In 2004 the Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the Eurpean  
Union. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania also joined. A number of countries are now (February 2012) formally candidate countries, that is, 
countries that have been accepted into formal negotiations: Croatia*, Iceland*, Macedonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM) and Turkey* (negotiations are underway for asterisked countries). Serbia has been recommended as an official candidate 
country, but talks have yet to open. Albania has applied for membership, but not yet been recommended. Bosnia and Herzogovina has 
a  Stabilisation  and Association  Agreement  with the  EU, normally  a  precursor  to  applying for  EU  membership.  Kosovo aspires  to 
membership, and a joint EU-Kosovan Stabilisation Tracking Mechanism is exploring issues around this.
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This article describes part of a small-scale qualitative investigation into how 
young people – aged between 11 and 18 - are constructing their identities 
and becoming aware of their actual or potential European identity in the 
three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.2 These countries are 
all  engaged  in  a  process  of  change,  having  become  members  of  the 
European Union in May 2004. However, there was an additional prior change 
to the status of the three countries in mid 1991, when they all  became 
independent of the USSR (Judt 2005, 646, 655). They had been independent 
states between 1920 and 1940, but between August 1940 and 1991 each 
had been formally incorporated into the Soviet Union as a Soviet Socialist 
Republic (and had also been occupied by Nazi forces, and claimed as part of 
the Reichskommissariat Ostland, between 1941 and 1945).
These events mean that in 2010 people under 19 in these three countries 
have some particular characteristics. Other than those over 70 years of age, 
this is the first generation to be born in the three independent states, and to 
have been wholly socialised into these self-governing communities. They will 
have no personal memories of the Soviet period, or of the events leading to 
the  establishment  of  the  independent  countries.  Parents  and  various 
histories  will  have  mediated  any narratives  they construct  of  the  events 
before 1991. They will also have become aware, over the past six years, of 
their country’s membership of the EU. Although they will  all  have this in 
common, these young people are by no means an homogeneous group (see 
Table 1). During the Soviet period3 there was considerable migration into the 
three territories from other Soviet Socialist Republics, particularly in Estonia 
and  Latvia  (Hiden,  Salmon  1994).  In  Lithuania,  there  were  also  some 
longstanding communities of Polish or Belarus origin, and the creation of the 
Polish-Lithuanian border in 1945 paid scant respect to the ethnic origin of 
any residents. There was also migration out of the territories–many of the 
immigrants  were  transient,  and  a  number  of  the  indigenous  population 
moved to  other  parts  of  the  USSR,  not  always  of  their  own free  will.  A 
number of the migrants into the territory married local people, and settled 
permanently. Since independence, some people of migrant origin living in 
the three countries have taken up citizenship of one of the three countries, 
and others have not. Many of those of migrant  origin have  adopted the 
language of the country in which they now live, but a proportion has not 
done so to a significant degree (Judt 2005, 644-645). Some, but not all, of 
these people may refer to themselves as being of Russian origin (russkiye, 
русские) and speak Russian: in this context, the term  russkiye is used to 
refer to members of one of a number of ethnic groups, not to citizenship of 
Russia ( россиянинrossiyanin, ). As will be seen, the term ‘Russian’ is used to 
include those of Ukrainian, Cossack, Belarusian and other origins, as well as 
those of ethnic Russian origin. 
2 This was part of a larger study of young people in the countries that have recently joined the European Union (2004-2007), and the 
countries that are currently candidate countries seeking membership in the future. The study was conducted under the aegis of a Jean 
Monnet ad personam Chair, awarded by the European Commission. I am grateful for this support, but emphasise that all the analysis  
and conclusions are my responsibility, and should not be construed in any way as the views or opinions of the European Commission. 
Thanks to Etina Annuskanc, Giedre Bagdonaite, Zoja Cehlova, Jolanta Desperat, Natalja Goliusova, Igors Ivashkins, Kristi Köiv, Catherine 
ŁKozjuhina,  Edgar  Krull,  Andrita  Krumina,  Giedre  Kvieskiene,  Urve  Laanempts,  Anna  Liduma,  Marcin  uczka,  Eve  Magi,  Marina 
Marchenoka, Antra Mazura, Jurgita Norvaisaite, Alina Petrauskiene, Sandra Rone, Zandra Rubene, Katya Simeonova, Anna Tatarinceva, 
Sulev Valdmaa, Gerda Vogule, Irena Zaleskiene and Vaiva Zuzeviciute. In London Metropolitan University, to Marta Pinto, Marko Bojcun 
and colleagues in IPSE for useful discussions and pointers, and to Angela Kamara for managing my travel and records.
3 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or Soviet Union (often wrongly referred to in the 1917-1991 period as ‘Russia’), was 
officially a Union of sub-national states, of which Russia was the largest and dominant. The three Baltic states were incorporated into 
the USSR in August 1940 as the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Lithuanian Soviet 
Socialist Republic. This was regarded as a Soviet Union occupation.
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Table 1. Ethnic composition of the populations of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, 2010
** data not classified in this category in this country
Sources: Estimates made by the various statistical offices of each country: 
Statistics Estonia (website of the Government of Estonia statistics office) http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/Dialog/statfile1.asp, accessed 
November 2, 2011; Latvia: Citizenship & Migration Affairs www.pmp.gov.lv/lv/statistika/dokuments/2011/21SVP_Latvija_pec_VPD.pff, 
accessed  November  2,  2011;  Lithuania:  Statistikos  Departmentas  http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/default.asp?w=1920,  accessed 
November 2, 2011; the Lithuanian data is rounded to the nearest 100, the Estonian and Latvian data is not
The young people with whom this study is concerned – 12 to 18 year olds –
therefore  include  those  who  have  both  parents  of 
Estonian/Latvian/Lithuanian origin, speaking the respective language; some 
who have two russkiye parents (possibly with Russian as the home language, 
and  possibly  attending  a  Russophone  school,  in  which  Russian  is  the 
medium of instruction);4 some with one parent  is  russkiye and the other 
Estonian/Latvian/ Lithuanian; and some with one or more grandparent of 
russkiye  origin (and some of  these  last  two groups are  also possibly in 
Russophone schools). The sample is discussed in detail below in Issues of 
methodology and Table 2.
2 Identities and Attachments: A Brief Discussion
Identities  are  increasingly  recognised  as  being  both  multiple  and 
constructed contingently and, for some, in a context that includes Europe. 
Such identities may include a range of intersecting dimensions, including 
gender, age and region. It appears that a growing number of young people 
in parts of the EU are acknowledging at least a partial sense of European 
identity  alongside  their  national  identity:  the  degree  to  which  this  is 
4 Russophone schools teach most subjects in Russian: they are state-funded, but cater for students of Russian-origin families who wish 
their children to be educated in Russian. They also teach Latvian or Estonian, and public examinations for University entrance are 
conducted in these languages, respectively.
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 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 N % n % n % 
Estonians 924,100 69.0 2,359 0.1 **  
Latvian 2,177 0.2 1,327,129 59.5 2,400 0.1 
Lithuanian 2,046 0.2 29,376 1.3 2,721,500 83.9 
Russian 341,450 25.5 610,297 27.4 174,900 5.4 
Polish 1,993 0.1 51,397 2.3 212,800 6.6 
Belorussian 15,315 1.1 78,556 3.5 41,100 1.3 
Ukrainian 27,530 2.1 54,425 2.4 21,100 0.6 
Finns 10,494 0.8 **  **  
Jewish  1,770 0.1 9,529 0.4 3,400 0.1 
Tartar 2,428 0.2 **  3,100 0.1 
German 1,918 0.1 4,548 0.2 3,000 0.1 
Romany ** 0.0 8,536 0.4 2,900 0.1 
Others 8,973 0.7 53,489 2.5 8,000 0.2 
Not known ** 0.0 **  50,400 1.5 
Total 1,340,194 100.0 2,236,910 100.0 3,244,600 100.0 
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acknowledged varies by nationality, gender and social class, as well as by 
age (Lutz et al 2006). European and national identities are not alternatives, 
but potentially complementary feelings that can be held in parallel (Licata 
2000). But what does this multiplicity mean for the young people involved? 
In these three countries, particular contrasts between the various ‘national’ 
or ‘ethnic’ communities allow the possibility of exploring constructions of 
not just identity and citizenship, but also of community and generation in 
these particular countries in the early 21st Century. 
I draw on two particular writers in framing this analysis of what a sense of 
European  identity  might  mean.  Michael  Bruter  (2005),  analysing  the 
emergence of mass European identity, describes the identities of citizens as 
having a civic and a cultural component. Individual have differing balances 
of the ‘civic’ (identification with “the set of institutions, rights and rules that 
preside  over  the  political  life  of  the  community”)  and  the  ‘cultural’ 
(“identification with a certain culture, social similarities, values” (Bruter 2005, 
12)).  Lynn  Jamieson,  writing  with  Sue  Grundy  describes  the  different 
processes  by which some  young people “come to present  themselves  as 
passionate  utopian  Europeans,  while  for  many  being  European  remains 
emotionally  insignificant  and  devoid  of  imagined  community  or  steps 
towards global citizenship” (Grundy, Jamieson 2007, 663).
My research questions were derived from these frameworks. Do these young 
people identify with a mixture of cultural and civic aspects of Europe, and 
how does this relate to the presence of the same two components in their 
identification  with  their  country?  To  what  extent  are  young  people 
passionate or indifferent about each? In Estonia and Latvia in particular, do 
russkiye young people see themselves as an identity community, and are 
they perceived as such by their Estonian and Latvian contemporaries? Do 
young people acknowledge their multiplicity of identities, and how much to 
they insist that their identity is singular, essentialist and immovable? Does 
their sense of their own identity require the construction of ‘the Other,’ a 
contrasting outside or alien identity to be held in juxtaposition to their own 
identity? This question is of particular significance to the subjects of this 
study: their eastern borders were created just twenty years ago, and as the 
borders of the European Union continue to demonstrate their flexibility, even 
an  ambiguity,  are  there  (in  the  minds  of  these  young  people)  limits  to 
Europe: where does the frontier lie? 
The  generational  identity  may  also  be  significant  in  this  context:  the 
experiences  of  this  generation  are  markedly  different  to  those  of  their 
parents and grandparents. In a recent study of generational identities in 20th 
Century Germany,  Fulbrook (2011) notes the ‘construction of a collective 
identity on the basis of generationally defined common experiences’ (11). 
Age, she suggest, is ‘crucial at times of transition, with respect to the ways 
in which people can become involved in new regimes and societies’ (488). 
Do  these  young  people  perceive  themselves  as  a  generation  differently 
available  for  political  and  social  mobilisation  than  their  parents  or 
grandparents?
The  complexities  and  diversities  of  these  societies,  coupled  with  their 
particular  recent  history,  make  them particularly  interesting  locations  in 
which to investigate the construction of identities. It is unlikely that simple 
dichotomies  of  Gemeinschaft  and  Gesellschaft (‘community’  and 
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‘society/association’) Tönnies  (1887,  reprint  2001)  will  be  useful:  the 
community  identities  in  these  countries  will  not  simple  contrast  the 
associative  process  of  a  ‘natural’  communitarian  will  with  a  rational 
individualistic  will  (Adair-Toteff  1995).  The  critical  communitarianism 
analysis  of Barzilai  (2003) suggests that  communities excluded from the 
processes of ruling – such as, arguably, the russkiye communities in Estonia 
and perhaps Latvia – might construct legal cultures that interact with aspects 
of political power: the identities constructed in such a process constitute 
communities protected by law and boundaries against other communities. Is 
such a process recognised and described by the young members of these 
communities? 
3 Issues of Methodology
These are big and complex questions, and putting them directly to young 
people will not, I argue, lead to coherent or meaningful answers. They may 
not  have  considered them,  and feel  obliged by the  interview context  to 
provide ‘an answer’; they may feel constrained by how they reply to a direct 
question; they will almost inevitably use the language and constructions of 
the questioner in making any response. The focuses of this study is on how 
these young peoples’ ideas are socially constructed. Social constructions are 
created through social interaction, in a social context, so my methodology 
has been to conduct focus groups with small groups of five to six pupils, all 
about the same age. In a focus group, the researcher introduces a few open-
ended questions, and encourages the pupils to discuss these between them 
so that they are interacting with each other, rather than with the researcher. 
As an example of this, here is a group of Latvians discussing what makes 
them ‘Latvian:’
Reines F5 (♂15¾) I’m not a total Latvian, I’m only partial. On my mother’s 
side, everyone was Latvian, but on my father’s side there 
is a very mixed line: there are Russian, Belarusians, and 
even Polish descent. I kind of respect both – I am a patriot 
of more than just one country.
Nellija G ♁( 14 ¾) It’s not the blood that makes your nationality. If you  
have a Russian mother and a Russian father, and you 
were born in Latvia and you learn the Latvian language, 
and you do everything as a Latvian would do – it 
doesn’t make a difference – 
Monta A6 ♁( 15½) – it’s more what’s in your head –
Agnese K ♁( 16.0) – and what you see every day. If you are Russian, but 
you live in Latvia, you don’t know how the Russians  
live in Russia, so – so you become Latvian. It’s really  
not a lot!
Monta A Also friends do some stuff to you. If you are Russian, 
5 All  names  have  been  changed so that  individuals  remain  anonymous.  They  are  identified  by  the  country  in  which  they  were 
interviewed, their gender and their age. The cities of Riga and Tallinn have not been anonomised.
6 Monta had earlier said she had ‘there’s someone from Russia in the family tree.’
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but your friends are Latvians, it’s possible that you’ll go 
more  Latvian  than  Russian  –  because  you’ll  speak  
Latvian all the time, and the jokes, and all that stuff …
Agnese K … The way you think is different …
Reines F It depends on what society you grow up in, what part of 
the country, even in what part of the town.
They  are  using  ideas,  language,  and  vocabulary  of  their  own  choosing, 
rather than responding to the interviewer. The researcher is non-directive – 
elucidating, guiding, but not focusing or constraining. Thus I might in an 
interview ask how they think Europe affects their lives, but if they collectively 
chose to discuss other aspects of their lives, my attempts to ‘get an answer’ 
are limited.
The  discussion  points  I  put  were  broad,  and  the  result  of  extensive 
discussions and trials. The following broad areas were covered, the form of 
words varying slightly from conversation to conversation,  as the context 
required.
- How would you describe your identity? (if necessary, prompting with ‘What 
do you all have in common?’, or, when [Latvian] was suggested, ‘What does 
being [Latvian] mean to you?’) 
- Do you ever describe yourselves in other ways, or feel you have difficulties 
always using this identity? 
- Do you think your parents feel the same way about this as you? 
- Do you think everyone in Latvia feels the same way? 
- How does being in Europe affect the way you think about your identity, and 
about your future? 
- What is particular or different about Europeans? 
- Can you imagine [Russia/Belarus/appropriate neighbour] becoming part of 
the European Union? 
In the three countries covered in this article, all the focus groups took place 
in March 2010. Nine locations were visited, in each case to some schools in 
the capital city, some to schools in the vicinity of the capital, and some to 
schools in a provincial town, ensuring a fairly wide geographical spread.
Table 2. Number and distribution of focus groups
One Russophone school was selected in Estonia and one in Latvia: all other schools used the national language as the medium of 
instruction) 
27 
Country locations number of 
schools 
number of 
classes 
number of 
pupils 
Estonia 2 4 6 44 
Latvia 3 6 8 50 
Lithuania 3 6 8 40 
 9 16 22 134 
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In each location, one to three schools, each with different social mixes were 
selected, and in each school focus groups were usually conducted with one 
or two groups of pupils – about five or six 12-14 year olds, and a similar 
group  of  15  to  17  year  olds.  Locations  were  selected  in  which  I  had 
colleagues who were willing to collaborate with me (selected to cover the 
capital city and one or two regional locations). Each colleague (see footnote 
2) was asked to identify two schools, one in a middle class area, the other in 
a working class area. Schools were asked to select six to eight pupils from a 
class, choosing an equal number of males and females willing to take part in 
a  discussion,  without  regard  to  ability  within  the  class.  Permission  was 
sought from all the young people to participate in the focus groups, and, for 
those  under  16,  also  from  their  parents  or  guardians.  It  should  be 
emphasised that I am not attempting to achieve a representative sample, but 
to identify the diversity of views expressed. The study is not concerned with 
legal  nationality or status,  but  young people  whose home is  now in the 
country (so if there are significant minorities or migrants, these may have 
been included).
The project would not have been possible without help and assistance from 
a large number of people, to whom I am indebted (see footnote 2). Schools 
and  parents  have  been  recruited,  arrangements  made  for  visits  and, 
critically, help given in translating many of the transcripts into English. The 
analysis that follows covers firstly the major themes and then moves towards 
some tentative conclusions.
4 Major Themes: Europe and Nation as a Focus for Identity
European Culture and Civic Institutions
The culture of Europe was less apparent in the young people’s talk than was 
their  reference to the civic practices of Europe.  In particular,  there  were 
many references to the possibility of travel to other European states and of 
studying and working there. Many of them, particularly the older students, 
said that they had considered higher education outside their own country, 
very often in other European Union states. They seemed well aware of the 
possibilities and options,  as they were of the issues concerning work in 
other, generally western, European countries. As will be seen, not all were in 
favour of taking up such opportunities, for example: 
There  are  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  working  here  and  also  
abroad. The advantages of working abroad are that it’s easier to find a 
job,  and  you  are  well  paid  abroad.  Everyone  tells  me  this.  The  
disadvantages – you can’t meet [ie see] your family, but you don’t have a 
♂good salary if you work here (Karlis M, Latvian  11½).
But there was also widespread appreciation that these opportunities were 
now available. Looking first at those of Lithuanian/Latvian Estonian descent, 
the sense of European unity and solidarity was evident in many comments. 
Lithuanians were generally more positive about identifying with European 
culture, for example: 
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The European Union has changed people’s opinions about Lithuania.  
Now people don’t think that we are beviltiškas [hopeless], and we can 
achieve something, we can give something to others. Now we feel that 
we are necessary, we are needed… (Kristina K, ♁ 16¾).
Some cited European-wide rights and freedoms:
We are free from Russia, and Russian has censorship – they are not as 
free as we are – and it’s a difference (Migle J, Lithuanian ♁ 15½).
On the other hand, some Latvians were sometimes suspicious, and made 
comments such as:
Many  Europeans  are  interested  in  having  our  workers,  as  they  are  
cheaper than their own … there are more drawbacks than advantages 
(Julia A, ♁ 14 ¾).
 
Though others were much more positive:
It kind of unifies us. We are all together, in one place, all Europeans, and 
♂we can feel that we’re kind of united (Reinis F,  15¾).
In Estonia, the older students were very positive about the European Union, 
for a wide variety of reasons – its emphasis of human rights and democracy, 
the  ability  to  participate  in  European-wide  decision  making  process, 
economic  support,  and,  of  course,  the  mobility  rights  associated  with 
membership.
We have more right to express our own opinion, more to say than we 
used to have (Helle K, ♁ 15¾). 
I think Europe is democratic because it controls all the members of the 
Union to make sure that Human Rights are protected, and that people 
have a good life and … that’s it (Imre T, ♁ 15¾).
I think the Europeans are calm and friendly, and very civilised (Lada D, 
Estonian ♁16¾).
 
Some younger voices were less enthusiastic:
I don’t see it as European – we belong to the Baltic area (Kristiin T, ♁ 
12¾). 
The students in the Russophone schools in Latvia tended to adopt a more 
distant, even critical standpoint: Europe undermined Latvian independence.
I  think that  we  have more disadvantages. Latvia  in future  will  be  a  
♂suburb of the European Union (Dmitri Y,  15½).
… I think Europeans people are culturally educated, most of them, I  
presume.  Though  when  it  comes  to  creativity,  innovations,  and  
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unconventional ways of thinking, I think Europeans are on the weaker 
♂side (Dmitrij P, , 16½).
The students in Russophone schools in Estonia were broadly positive about 
their European identity, for example for travel and for economic support.   
I think Europe is important in my life, because it’s open to travel a lot, 
and I do a lot of travelling, and we don’t have to have a visa (Zhenya K, ♁ 16 ¾).
Though there were also some sceptical voices:
It is not good, but in between – it hasn’t made much difference (Gennady 
♂S,  14¾).
But students who had some Russian ancestry and were in national language 
schools were notably more positive, in all three countries. 
There are differences between Europe and Russia. In Russia, people can 
live  without  documents but  this  seldom occurs in Europe,  Also,  the  
police are rather corrupt in Russia – you if you give a little bribe, they 
♂accept it, and that’s how the system works (Kristjan T, Estonian  15).
I think the European Union is a very good thing, because we’re not so 
[confined] to our own country. We can move and the Union can help us 
do something. We can start some new things – we can study abroad. For 
example, in the USSR our parents couldn’t leave their country, and they 
didn’t know what was abroad. And this European Union helps us to know 
what is happening in the world. So we’re connected in the world (Lada 
D, Estonian ♁ 16¾).
European identity thus appears to be largely associated more towards the 
institutional end of Bruter’s (2005) spectrum, rather than the cultural. There 
was generally some enthusiasm for a European identity, but it was in many 
ways  around  instrumental  ends  –  access  to  travel  and  study  in  other 
European  states  in  particular  –  rather  than  about  deeper  feelings  of 
belonging, although there is some evidence that the democratic and rights-
based freedoms associated with the EU were valued.
5 National Culture and Civic Institutions
Generally, most young people were more talkative about their own country, 
rather than Europe. There were many references to the national language, 
which  for  many was  one  of  the  defining  facets  of  their  unique  cultural 
identity: it was spoken by very few other people in the world. As Vaiva S 
(Lithuanian  ♁ 17) put it: ‘Our language is one of the oldest languages in 
Europe, and it’s hard to learn it  – so in languages we are different from 
other countries.’ ‘We speak in Estonian,’ said Anett L (Estonian ♁ 13¼) said 
♂when asked what defined her group. Anton Z (Latvian  15) explained that, 
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though his parents were of Russian origin, ‘but I use the Latvian language, 
and follow Latvian traditions and customs, I know Latvian history,’ and this 
made him ‘sometimes feel Latvian.’ 
It was generally the Lithuanian students who were more positive (though not 
uncritically) about their national culture than young people in Estonia and 
Latvia.  For  example,  Brigita  K (♁ 15¾),  discusses  how her  pride  in  her 
country compares to that of her parents, and the dilemmas of emigration:
I like this country, I’m proud of it, everything is close and homely. … My 
dad, he’s a real patriot, he has no plans to leave our country, but my 
mum, she’s like me, and she has a wider perspective – sometimes she 
discusses,  as I  do,  the possibility of  leaving ...  the people who are  
leaving are running away from the problems … of course they love our 
country, but they leave … all the problems for someone else to sort out. 
They’re not trying to do anything to solve it themselves.
There were widespread fears about the decline in population, from a falling 
birthrate and emigration. (This was also true in the other Baltic countries.) 
Vaiva S (♁ 17) sees aspects of national pride even in this: 
We were the first in Europe to have our own constitution – it was in the 
second  world  war.  …When  we  were  trying  to  get  our  freedom and 
independence, and there was more fighting for our freedom, we talked 
about it more – now we are talking less and less about our citizenship. 
We don’t feel patriotic, because we emigrate to other countries, and live 
and work there – but we send the money for our families. There are 
some communities in other countries, and they don’t forget Lithuania – 
they always remember it and try to show to foreigners who Lithuanians 
are. 
But many young people also expressed a sense of change in the meaning of 
being Lithuanian. They were less patriotic than their parents, and saw that 
globalisation and EU membership were changing aspects of the culture.
Other cultures are coming to Lithuania and … our cultures and traditions 
♂are getting a little less important to people (Edgaras F,  15½).
Some thought Lithuanians had a negative image in Europe, and that many 
people did not know where the country was.
If other countries hear anything about Lithuania, they hear bad things, 
not good ones (Migle A, ♁ 15 ¾).
Other countries really don’t know where Lithuania is (Grinvydas A,  ♂ 
15¼).
Pride in Lithuanian national identity was not confined only to those of pure 
♂Lithuanian descent. Tadas (  16) explains: 
Well, I wouldn’t identify myself as a 100% Lithuanian, because I’m not. 
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Only one-fifth of  my blood is  Lithuanian.  The  other parts  are  from  
Poland, Russia, Ukraine and even Georgia. So I couldn’t  say that I’m  
absolutely Lithuanian. But, because I’m living here, and I’m feeling a  
little patriotic, I think I could identify myself as a Lithuanian. Yes.
♂Andrius A (  12½) began by talking about his feelings of being Lithuanian, 
only  later  in  the  conversation  revealing  that  he  was  of  partly  German 
descent. 
I  like  to  be  Lithuanian.  …  It’s  a  unique  country,  it  has  its  own  
achievements, her own language. It’s a great country – but now the  
times are not very good. … My grandmother is from Germany, she’s my 
father’s mother, but we feel really Lithuanian. We talk in Lithuanian. My 
dad feels real Lithuanian – he doesn’t even speak German. My parents 
have lots of plans to go on living in Lithuania. 
Half of my blood is from Russia – well my dad is from Russia, and his 
father is from Russia, obviously, but my mother is Lithuanian and I was 
born here in Elektrenai, so that I can say that I’m Lithuanian, for sure 
(Edgaras F, Lithuanian ♂ 15½).
Estonia  also  had  young  people  who  were  positive  about  their  cultural 
identity, but others who were less articulate or more critical references. For 
♂example, Mikk N (  13¼) was broadly positive about his Estonian heritage, 
but less able to identify its characteristics: 
Estonians like singing and dancing. We have dance festivals and song 
festivals… Bread – we have black bread, and I think that it's the world's 
best bread. … Last year we had Olympic wins and medals, and I think 
Estonia has good athletes. … I think my parents like it that Estonia is 
free. I  see them happy when they talk about Estonia when it's a free 
country, and they think it's good.
Other young Estonians were even less articulate: asked ‘What does Estonia 
as a state mean to you?’ Anet K (Estonian  ♁ 13) can only respond ‘I just 
♂don’t  know.’  Taavi  S  (  13)  defines  Estonia  as  ‘a  small  country,’  and 
recognises that ‘I don’t think my parents understand things the same way: 
♂… they know the history much better’. Kaija M (  16) is ambivalent: to her, 
Estonians are 
depressed or something … when I  go to somewhere else,  and meet 
people on the street, they smile always, they say hello, even if they 
don’t know you … but in Estonia, people are so… It’s a small country, 
it’s nice … we should try and find something positive! … My parents 
don’t mind being Estonians, but they hate living in Estonia.
Estonian students also held their national civic institutions and practices in 
low  esteem.  There  were  many  complaints  about  national  politics,  for 
example, Liisi N (♁ 13¼) was articulate about her concerns: 
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I  don't  like  politics.  Politics  and  politicians,  both.  They're  terrible. 
They're not doing this for their country [laughs] … I don't know. I think, 
maybe 15 years ago, politics was more normal than now. Sometimes I 
look at the news and read the paper, and I get this bad impression. The 
election commercials say 'Oh, it will be so good! We are making it all 
great!' And smarter people than them are saying that it's not possible, 
and they are lying, and they are just trying to sell themselves.
Bad politics – they fight  each other.  They don’t  agree on important 
decisions – they are like … children [laughter]. Always fighting … (Hillar 
♂S,  16¾).
There was a similar range from the positive to the negative in Latvia: on the 
affirmative side, Anna K (♁ 13½) saw her personal commitment as positive 
and active:
I think that we are the future of Latvia, and we must keep the language 
and do everything we need to save our language – so that Latvia can be 
as it is. … I am proud of Latvia. We are such a small country, but we 
have Olympic champions – I’m proud of it, and I think we need to do 
something to make the others think the same way.
Žanete D (♁13¼) saw the problems on the cultural and the demographic 
side,  but  linked  this  to  her  pride  in  the  country’s  freedom  and 
independence:
We have to try to save Latvian traditions, we have to speak Latvian, and 
we have to make the population grow – get more babies born. …– I am 
a patriotic Latvian, but my dad has got a different view – He wasn’t 
working here, so he found a job in England, and he went away. … My 
mother told me than when she was little kids couldn’t have their own 
opinion – but now we can think for ourselves, we are free – we aren’t 
under oppression.
On the other hand, some young Latvians felt disempowered. Klinta C (♁ 15) 
said ‘I  feel satisfied with my country – I  like the place’ but went  on ‘we 
cannot change what is happening. We cannot change the future of Latvia.’ 
Nellija G (♁ 14¾) was more critical of Estonian politics and social behaviour:
I  don’t  see myself  as a true patriot,  because I  think there’s a lot  of 
things that are wrong in our country, and I understand some people 
might think that it’s wrong for me to say so, but that’s just the open 
mind I have – I read about the politicians in our country, I don’t think 
that I should be proud about that ….there’s a lot of people on the street 
that are technically Latvians, but I am so not proud to count them as 
Latvians, because of all of the bad things they do.
For  these  students  of  ‘national’  origin  –  84%  of  Lithuanians,  69%  of 
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Estonians, and just under 60% of Latvians (see Table 1 above) – the concept 
of affinity to the nation and the national community was centred more on 
the cultural  aspects identified by Bruter, rather than the institutions, and 
was very largely positive. There was often a tension between this sense of 
national identity and the need to create an independent and economically 
viable future. 
A number of the students in the Russophone schools in Estonia and Latvia 
were particularly more negative than students in national language schools.7 
For example, Zhenya K (Estonian ♁ 16¾) described herself in distinctly non-
Estonian terms: 
I think am European – I have a European passport, but I have Russian 
traditions in my family – both of my parents have Russian nationality. If 
my mother tongue was Estonian, I could say I am Estonian by nationality 
– but my native language is Russian, and I can’t say I’m Estonian. …I’m 
going to study in Scotland … I want to study, there, work there, and 
maybe take my parents there too – because they too have no future 
here, they have no job and the skills needed to develop in the future.
♂In the same school, Bogdan H (  16¾) said:
I don’t think I’m a real Estonian, but I have an Estonian passport. Yes, I 
was born in Estonia, but my parents are Russian, and my grandfather 
and grandmother are Russian too. So I think that I’m Russian, even if I 
go to England, for example, or Germany, I will be Russian. I think that 
I’m Russian, but I live in Estonia.
I think I’m Russian, because I always speak the Russian language …. My 
parents want my future to be living in Estonia, but I don’t want to live in 
♂Estonia, I don’t see my future here (Gennady S,  14¾). 
Some of these Russophone Estonians were learning the Estonian language, 
but  for  strictly  instrumental,  rather  than  cultural  reasons.  To  achieve 
sufficiently well to gain a University place, they needed good Estonian, but 
after this:
In my future I will  use English, I think. Estonian – it’s now to talk with 
people on the street  and know friends, but I  don’t want to live here 
later,  and  …  we  learn  Estonian  because  we  have  to  pass  the 
examination in the twelfth form (Zhenya K, ♁ 16¾).
I learn Estonian because I have to do it at school. I want to have good 
marks. In future I hope that I will study and work abroad and I think I 
won’t need Estonian (Tatyana O, ♁ 16¼).
Pinja  K  (♁14)  also  complained  of  being  ostracised by  native  Estonians: 
‘Many people don’t understand me when I say that I am Russian: Estonian 
7 As in Latvia, the term ‘Russian’ was sometimes used as a convenience, and contingently: ‘I was in Croatia, and someone asked me  
where I was from – and I said in Estonia, and I saw from their eyes ‘Where is that?’ So it’s quite easy to say that you are from Russia,  
and they will  understand quicker and there’ll  be no problems with explanations. So I  say I’m from Russia to avoid geographical 
explanations that ‘Estonian is situated west of Russia …’ (Zhenya K, ♁ 16¾)
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people don’t like Russian so much – and it is a problem.’ [They don’t like the 
Russian  language?]  ‘Mmm  –  they  don’t  like  Russian  people.  …If  the 
[Estonian] government could be friendly with Russia.’ 
I feel like I am a Russian in Estonia. … Sometimes I want to talk with 
Estonian boys and girls, but they just look at me like I’m not a normal 
girl, and don’t want to speak with me. … Someone Estonian told me 
that I’m Russian and they don’t want to speak to me. … It’s a really 
difficult situation, because we want to have friends here, but we have 
only to speak with Russians, because only Russians can understand us, 
and it’s very difficult (Dina B, ♁14 ¾).
A substantial number of the ethnic Estonian young people I spoke with had 
some  reservations  about  Russians  in  Estonia,  expressed  with  various 
degrees of caution.
They have this kind of temperament. It’s already in their blood. They 
are very brave and courageous,  and they can’t  do anything about  it 
(Merilin T, ♁ 12½).
♂They are arrogant (Daniel V,  12¼).
Most do learn the language, and they live here as Estonians: they don’t 
think  of  themselves  as  Russians.  But  of  course,  there  are  others 
♂(Jaagkup K,  16½).
In  Latvia, most students in a provincial Russophone school were similarly 
critical of national institutions, asserting they saw no future for themselves 
as Latvians. 
We can’t see our futures in Latvia. I often talk to my parents about this, 
and  my  economic  future,  and  my  parents  have  decided  that  after 
finishing school, I should go abroad, because Latvia does not have a 
♂future (Anton Z, 15).
I  belong  to  the  Russian  nation.  Sometimes  I  feel  that  I’m  Latvian, 
because I know Latvian. I learned it well, and one part of my family are 
Russians, and one part is Latvians – that’s why sometimes I feel Latvian. 
…Our politicians are not professional people [so] we have decisions that 
♂destroy our economy,  our political  life and our society (Dimitri  Y,  
15½).
In a Russophone school in Riga, the students were more sophisticated and 
nuanced in their criticisms.
I am neither Russian nor Latvian. With my soul I am here in Latvia, but 
at the same time I like Russian culture and Cossack culture very much. I 
respect the Latvian culture. My father believes that he is a true Russian, 
though sometimes he lives and works in different countries. My mum 
has both Polish and Ukrainian roots, but she respects both Latvian and 
Russian cultures (Anastasija Z, ♁ 13½).
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I  consider myself Russian. I  respect Latvian and Russian cultures the 
same. I watch TV and listen to music in Russian. We all live in Latvia, we 
follow  Latvian  traditions,  but  at  the  same  time  we  are  different 
♂(Stanislav M,  13½).
Many  of  these  young  people,  with  Latvian  passports,  but  not  Latvian 
nationality,  felt  under  threat  and  oppressed  by  the  Latvian  state,  and 
identified themselves as Russian almost as a ‘flag of convenience,’ as a label 
that identifies them as being the other. 
Engagement in different cultural activities and traditions also helped define 
national identity. Two Russian-origin pupils in the same town gave differing 
accounts: ‘we celebrate Russian holidays, Russian traditions, and that’s why 
I feel myself as Russian’ (Marina M, ♁ 12¾), and ‘we’ve lived in Latvia for so 
long we have taken up Latvian traditions – nearly all Russian people who live 
♂here celebrate Leiga … so sometimes I feel myself to be Latvian’ (Anton Z,  
15).
For  these  students  of  Russian  origin  in  Estonia  and  Latvia,  the  cultural 
identity of being  russkiye was particularly strong, but was coupled with a 
desire  to  distance  themselves  from  the  possibility  of  being  considered 
institutionally Russian, or being identified with the Russian state, sometimes 
verging on antipathy. In terms of their formal civic status, there was a clear 
ambivalence:  many  felt  ‘othered’  by  their  national  Estonian  and  Latvian 
peers, and a desire to respond by constructing their own community centred 
on the Russian language and culture, but at the same time a clear sense of 
valuing their  Estonian and Latvian citizenship,  because this gave them a 
European Citizen status, and thus literally a passport to escape the social 
exclusion they faced in these countries.
But,  interestingly,  it  was  some of  the  students  who  had partial  Russian 
ancestry, studying in the national language schools, who were most positive 
about the national culture. Those in Lithuania have already been quoted. In 
♂Latvia, Matiss K (  13¼) claimed to be proud to be Latvian. 
I am Russian – I am born in Latvia, and I feel like a Latvian. I  speak 
pretty good Latvian, my friends are Latvian, and my dad is Latvian. … I 
don’t feel I am Russian. Because I don’t speak Russian in the street – I 
only speak Russian at home with my mum, and in Russian lessons in 
school. .. I am really proud that I’m Latvian. I want to grow up to go to 
America and to be an NBA player, and to let everyone know that Latvia 
is  great  like  the  basketball  players  Mārtins Kravčenko and  Andris 
Biedrinš. I want to play like the heroes.
Monta A (♁ 15½) demonstrated similar ambivalences, professing a love for 
the country, but a firm sense of her own priorities and needs.
I don’t think I’m Russian, but I also don’t count myself Latvian. I don’t 
know why, I couldn’t say … it’s more what’s in your head. Also friends 
do some stuff to you. If you are Russian, but your friends are Latvians, 
it’s possible that you’ll go more Latvian than Russian – because you’ll 
speak Latvian all  the time, and the jokes, and all  that stuff  …[But] I 
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think more about myself, not about the country. If we speak honestly, I 
think more about what I am going to do, what I need, and what I want – 
not about what the country needs, what will happen to our country. 
6 Multiple Identities and Acceptance of Diversity: The Frontier
While most students in all three countries saw themselves as having multiple 
identities, there were differences in the way that this was expressed. Very 
broadly, while many of the young people of Latvian/ Lithuanian/ Estonian 
decent  were prepared to identify with their own country and with, to an 
extent, being European, these groups seemed less happy with the young 
people of Russian origin professing to be both Russian and European. Many 
of the Russian descent group also indicated some level of identification with 
the local state–but very notably not so in a number of cases, particularly in 
Estonia.  Language  was  seen  as  important  –  many  complained  at 
Russophones  not  learning  the  national  language,  or  not  learning  it 
sufficiently well. Brigita K (Lithuanian ♁ 15¾) complained ‘…in our capital, 
where most of the people should be Lithuanians, there are a lot of Russians 
– even some of the names on the shops are in Russian.’
In Estonia, the students in Russophone schools saw themselves as Russians 
and Europeans who were ‘living in Estonia;’ students in similar schools in 
Latvia were more inclined to describe themselves as Russian with Latvian 
citizenship. In Estonia, it was also evident that females and younger students 
were more likely to see themselves with multiple identities, while in Latvia 
older students were more so inclined.
Assessing perceptions of tolerance towards such differences was not easy. It 
might be tentatively suggested that the Estonian students were less tolerant 
than the Latvian and Lithuanians.  More  interesting was the difference in 
perceptions of those with Russian ancestry in national language schools in 
the three countries – the Lithuanians were far more accepting of diversity 
than the Estonians, with the Latvians somewhere in between. 
The attitude towards ‘the other’ appeared to be most apparent in the ways in 
which  русские Россия, russkiye, and the country, , were described. In some 
situations, young people distinguished between Russians and those of their 
own country, or ‘Europeans.’
What was striking in most comments was the dichotomies that were drawn 
between Russia and Russians and the Baltic states and the Europeans.
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Table 3. Estonian student comments about Russians and Estonians
Estonian by 
descent
Russophone 
schools in 
Estonia (Russian 
by descent)
Russians/Russia
• living in the past
• big and rich, doesn’t need help
• not democratic
• does not respect human rights
• police are corrupt/take bribes
• too aggressive (attacked Georgia)
• have their own Union
• rich and powerful
• has terrorism
• implements its own rules
Estonia/Europeans
• look forward to the future
• little counties need help
• democratic
• protects human rights
• corruption seldom in Europe
• now free from Russia
• –
• less powerful, less rich
• peaceful, little terrorism
• common rules
Table 4. Latvian student comments about Russians and Latvians 
Latvia by descent
Part Latvian, part 
russkiye
Russophone schools 
in Latvia
(Russian by 
descent)
Russians/Russia
• living in the past 
• dangerous
• too powerful, aggressive
• selfish
• big
• strong enough to solve 
problems by itself
• a big country 
• powerful
• civil wars and riots
• Russia could develop Latvia
• rich resources
• good industrial & IT 
development
• produces goods and exports
Latvia/Europeans
• forward looking
• peaceful
• –
• try to help each other
• small
• needs to unite
• small countries
• –
• peacefuldependent on Russian 
resources
• squander resources
• economy is going downhill
• does not produce anything
• poor political decisions
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Table 5. Lithuanian student comments about Russians and Lithuanians
Lithuanian by 
descent
part Lithuanian, 
part russkiye
Russians/Russia
• rough, not friendly 
• brave, active and emotional
• stuck in the old ages - 
• conservative
• don’t like sharing with others: 
want to take everything
• crude grubus and abrasive 
įžūlus
• oppressive, occupiers
• some are hospitable svetingas
• Some are friendly some 
unfriendly – many opinions are 
from long ago
• A big civilised country
• Kind and friendly when you 
get to know them
Lithuania/Europeans
• sensitive and kind 
• calm
• forward looking
• –
• friendly, sharing, collaborative
• peaceful
• –
• –
This suggests that, to many of these young people of Estonian, Latvian or 
Lithuanian descent, ‘the Russians’ are perceived as outsiders: partly through 
memories (and history lessons) about relationships in earlier times, but also 
through perceptions of  current  behaviour.  There  were  two groups that  I 
identified who had alternative discourses. The Russian-origin young people 
in the Latvian provincial town – strongly supported by the teaching staff – 
saw Russia not just as a supporter for their position, but as an alternative 
and  a  better  protector  for  Latvia  than  the  European  Union.  By  way  of 
contrast, the Lithuanians who were of part-Russian descent in the Lithuanian 
language  schools  were  sufficiently  confident  to  counter  their  colleagues 
stereotypical views of Russians with examples drawn from their experience 
of visiting family members in the Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. Their 
assertions were accepted courteously, and acknowledged by some as valid 
observations on the tendency to generalise.
To  provoke  discussion  on  where  they  thought  the  eventual  ‘frontier’  of 
Europe might lie, groups were asked whether they thought Russia or Belarus 
might ever become members of the EU. The reaction of almost all those 
surveyed  was  strongly  against  Russian  membership.  When  asked  why, 
various explanations were offered, including the geographical reason that 
most of Russia was outside Europe, but most demonstrated a concern of 
possible  Russian  dominance,  even  aggression.  It  was  socially  different, 
unlikely to cooperate and support smaller countries, was undemocratic and 
autocratic, and likely to allow potential terrorists into Europe.8 It would also 
8 The focus groups were conducted shortly after the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings, when two suicide bombs were set of on the Metro 
ż(March 29, 2010). At least 40 people were killed, and over 100 injured, and this was widely reported at the time. Rogo a, Jadwiga and 
Żochowski, Piotr (31 March 2010) ‘Attacks in the Moscow Metro’, Eastweek, Centre for Eastern Studies (Poland): 
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allow further Russian migration into the Baltic countries.  Such cautionary 
resistance was also shown by the Russian-descent young people in Riga and 
Tallinn:  they did not  see Russian membership either  potentially  likely or 
desirable.  Even the Russian-origin young people in the Latvian provincial 
town were against the idea, on the grounds that Russia did not need to be 
propped up by the EU, and indeed, it would be better for Latvia to be in 
some form of association with Russia than with the EU. 
Belarus was less discussed. Most informants saw no reason for not including 
it  in the EU:  it  was another small  state,  with a narrative  of having been 
oppressed by the  Soviet  Union.  One  Estonian was  very  much against  it, 
saying that it was a dictatorship and that the European Union countries were 
all democracies upholding human rights. Belarus could not join until it was 
reformed.
There was a clear impression that, for the time being at least, these young 
people saw themselves as being on the frontier of Europe. Their country was 
now on the desirable side of the border, and the border had the function of 
keeping those beyond at arms length.
7 Conclusions
I have tried in the analysis above to largely let these young people describe 
their  identities  –  as  members  of  countries,  as  members  of  communities 
within these, as ‘Europeans’– in their own words. They describe themselves 
contextually and contingently of various ancestries and language groups, in 
countries that have had chequered histories, in which their ancestors may 
have had very different roles. But these young people were able to construct 
explanations  of  who  they  were  that  were  contingent  on  their  current 
circumstances. They could, where necessary, begin to cut loose from their 
parents’ (and their teachers’) preoccupations. They were, to an extent, aware 
of the past, but their concerns were for the future. Their country was more 
prominent in most of their discourses, more so than Europe. They seemed 
more proud and appreciative of their country’s culture, its language, and 
sometimes its  sport  than they did of  its  politicians  and civic  structures, 
although a number were clearly aware of and proud of their independence, 
freedoms and rights. 
There  were  differences  in  attitudes  towards  the  Russian  minority 
communities, and in the responses of those minorities to the majority. In 
Lithuania, the majority group of Lithuanian descent appeared to be most 
relaxed towards the minority.  Although there were references to parents 
being involved in the struggle over the television station in 1991, there was 
much evidence of an easy relationship between young people from the two 
groups, that was reciprocal and appeared to result in a relaxed atmosphere 
in  which  both  groups  could  discuss  cultures,  histories,  feelings  and 
identities  in an open manner  that  tolerated diversity and flexibility.  The 
expression of  multiple identities was easy,  common and appeared to be 
found as useful (Hall 1992; Sen 2006). 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2010-03-31/attacks-moscow-metro
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The situation in Latvia was more complex. In one of the Russophone schools 
I  visited,  the  young  people  were  careful  to  position  themselves  midway 
between a Russian and a Latvian identity,  with firm references also to a 
European dimension. In the other school, less sophisticated young people 
were  more  irritably  positioning  themselves  as  Russian,  not  European  or 
Latvian (both of whose policies and practices they disparaged). The Latvian-
origin young people were, in turn, more critical of what they perceived of as 
some Russian-original people adopting an isolationist position (particularly 
in terms of language use): but they were also still very willing to interact 
positively with those of  Russian,  or  part-Russian origin who they saw as 
accepting a part-Latvian identity.  Where there were relationships between 
Latvian origin and Russian origin students in schools, they appeared to me 
to be as cordial and relaxed as those I saw in Lithuania. 
In Estonia, relationships generally seemed more tense. Many of the Russian-
origin students cited examples of  ostracism and isolation,  and pointedly 
described  themselves  as  being  Russian  and  European,  merely  living  in 
Estonia (and with Estonian citizenship). They were described to me as ‘sitting 
on their suitcases,’ waiting to qualify for university, get a degree, and avail 
themselves of the European Union’s free labour market. The Estonian-origin 
young people were critical of what they described as Russian isolationism. 
The greater the tension between groups in a plural society, the more likely it 
seems  that  the  majority  and  the  minority  will  adopt  singular  and  rigid 
identities,  accentuating  difference  and  ‘othering’  (Schöpflin  2010).  In 
contrast, where tensions are lower, both minority and majority are able to 
adopt  multiple  identities  that  enable  individuals  to  flexibly  situate 
themselves with several descriptors, each of which can come contingently to 
the fore as circumstances require (Ross 2008). This allows for distinctions to 
become  less  evident  and  for  the  stress  on  commonalities  rather  than 
differences. The adoption and acceptance of multiple identities allows for 
the recognition and acceptance of diversity, which in turn supports identities 
to be contingent and multiple is a society (Power 2000).
The impact of Europe, and particularly the European Union, was significant 
for most of these young people. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the principal way in 
which they say it impacts on their futures was instrumental. Current labour 
and demographic trends in all three countries mean that many young people 
are  considering  seeking  either  further  and  higher  education  in  western 
Europe, possibly followed by a period of employment. Although some think 
that they will reject this possibility – citing their love of their national culture, 
for example – the point is that they are aware of the possibility. For some of 
the Russian-origin minority in Estonia, this possibility was becoming a very 
real plan of action. The only group that did not see the European Union’s 
mobility  policies  as  a  potential  advantage  were  some  of  the  provincial 
Russian-origin Latvians, living near the Russian border. A number of these 
spurned  the  Europe  Union  as  an  irrelevant  to  their  lives,  and  were 
considering futures in Russia,  Belarus and the Ukraine. But the European 
Union  was  not  only  seen  in  terms  of  individual  mobility.  There  were 
references to the economic security and support the Union brought; to the 
security and defence brought by NATO membership (eg . Mölder 2006; Molis 
2008).
For these young people, the European Union was important. Many expressed 
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feelings of affinity with Europe, of being European – perhaps not as much as 
being Latvian or Estonian, perhaps, but nevertheless, of having a European 
identity. The significant borders had shifted – they had been created by the 
actions of their parents’ generation in 1991, and had been consolidated by 
accession to the Union in 2004. The first event, just before they were born, 
established  a  new  and  important  eastern  boundary:  the  second  event 
dissolved the boundaries with western Europe. There were still  threats to 
their nation-states: internal divisions in the population diversity, economic 
viability, the significant loss of population through emigration, and concern 
about  a  powerful  eastern  neighbour.  But  the  opportunity  to  embrace 
multiple identities that was afforded by the new context was welcomed by 
the  great  majority,  of  whatever  origin,  offering  a  way  of  constructing 
difference and change in the context of globalisation.
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